The ethics of virtue do not accept the distinction between, on the one hand, a categorically binding morality and, on the other hand, prudential questions about how to live one`s life on the other. More importantly, it does not focus on the moral patient, but on the agent (Slote 1997, 177). It is not the other person involved, but the character of the officer that is considered essential. In this way, the normative individualism of the ethics of virtue is at best a party limited to the individual agent. It would be abrupt to follow the ethics of virtue without criticism in this trend. Indeed, it is likely that the objectives and wishes of others concerned concern not only the actions and consequences, but also the character of the agent. What for? We generally believe that our goals and wishes are more likely to be met by officers with good (moral) character. As a result, each of us will wish that the others would have such a character. Whether and when this wish is appropriate is another question. The crucial point is this: taking into account the character of the agents is compatible with an individualistic normative focus on others and does not mean that attention should be focused solely on the character of the agent For these philosophers, ethics is an investigation to right and wrongly by a critical confrontation with the reasons underlying practices and beliefs. As a theory to justify moral practices and beliefs, ethical relativism does not recognize that some societies have better reasons to defend their opinions than others. As soon as we adopt the perspective of action, any decision on how to act will depend on the actual or foreseeable consequences of the options available. If we can predict the amount of utility/good results generated by different possible actions, we can know what are the right or wrong.

I have put aside cases here where individuals deliberately consent to the insolubility of a community, for example. B in the case of marriage or order. Given that all five elements are necessary for a normative ethic and are interdependent, it would be unwise to isolate them; it would be as useless as describing, for example, only the gear wheels of a watch and not the clock machine as a whole. Of course, we can describe the properties of the gears themselves, such as their size or weight, or their molecular and atomic structure. But it is its function as an integral part of the watch that makes it unique as a cog. If we look at complex conceptual structures as ethical theories, we cannot simply isolate their overt properties, as with gears. The elements of an ethic can only be characterized by their functional relationship in the context of ethical reasoning and justification. Therefore, a philosophical study should focus on this correlation instead of analyzing the various elements in detail. As a result, the five elements are discussed together, but the price is that if we looked at only one of them, we cannot study them in the most comprehensive way possible. Similar arguments of the “division of labour” can be used to provide unbiased justifications for other partial rules and practices.

Teachers, for example, have special duties to students in their own classrooms and do not have a duty to educate all students. Similarly, civil servants can and must participate in the jurisdiction in which they work. For example, if the overall goal is to maximize the well-being of all people in all cities, we will probably get better results if people who know and understand certain cities focus on them, while others focus on other cities.